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It is a measure of the importance of a work that it upsets the chattering classes. 
Writing in the New York Review of Books, John Gray declares Less than Nothing to 
be a ‘feat of intellectual overproduction’ that ‘amounts in the end to less than nothing’ 
(Gray, 2012). Gray is dismissive of Žižek’s attempts to elucidate the functioning of 
today’s paraconsistent logic, but ironically in a paraconsistent way. For Gray, we 
should reject Žižek’s work not only because it says nothing but also because of its 
dark tendencies towards violence and an implicit anti-Semitism (a calumny that 
allows Gray to recoil in liberal outrage and thereby to retreat from any substantial 
engagement). Thus not only is there nothing to Žižek but also we must be constantly 
vigilant against the threat that he poses.   
 
Jonathan Rée takes a different tack, complaining at the lack of a ‘culminating 
revelation’ in Žižek’s book (Rée, 2012). According to Rée, Žižek should stick to ‘brief 
intellectual entertainments’ and should not disappoint us with serious philosophical 
intent; he should delight rather than challenge. Instead of old philosophy, Žižek would 
do better to offer (brief) commentaries on ‘poverty, inequality, war, finance, childcare, 
intolerance, crime, education, famine, nationalism, medicine, climate change…the 
production of goods…(and) the most pressing social issues of our time’ (Rée, 2012). 
Notwithstanding the fact that Žižek has engaged (and continues to engage) with all of 
these issues and more, the interesting point here is what is revealed about the type 
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of role that Žižek is expected to play. For Rée, Žižek should at least entertain and at 
most act as ‘our’ conscience. In other words, Žižek should play the role of a modern 
court jester. And as Žižek has pointed out, the paraconsistent function of the jester is 
to effectively reproduce the existing power regime through subversion – the logic of 
which is also embodied in the contemporary forms of (acceptable) subversion 
through liberal-left punditry, political satire, infotainment and so on.    
 
Žižek’s central claim is that today, more than ever, there is an urgent need to repeat 
Hegel; not in a straightforward sense, but in a way that develops Hegelian openings 
and (dialectical) principles in critical and materialist terms. Yet from the perspective 
of contemporary thought, this can only appear as somewhat perverse. Is not Hegel 
someone who, according to Deleuze, should simply be forgotten; someone whose 
‘view of philosophy is at best a magnificent ruin’ (Rée, 2012)? How can Hegel – a 
philosopher who affirms repeatedly the ideas of necessity and totality – hold any 
relevance for our postmodern hyper-chaotic world?  
 
The contemporary world is caught in a mythological paradox.  On the one hand, the 
dominant (Western) milieu is one that continuously recycles its themes of individual 
expression, free choice, infinite possibility and so on. On the other hand, this milieu is 
organized around a deeply fatalist core: capitalist fundamentalism. Everything can be 
subverted and/or overcome except the basic principles of capitalism. Interfering with 
the spontaneous movements of capital is strictly taboo and, when markets do 
collapse, we should rather sacrifice ourselves through austerity measures in order to 
appease the Gods of finance. What is manifested here is a kind of twisted Kantian 
logic: not only is it impossible to penetrate to the in-itself or absolute, we should not 
even try. We should restrict ourselves to the subjective universe and not try to disturb 
the transcendental structures. This is at the root of today’s forms of new age 
spirituality. In the West this is reflected in a montage of Buddhism, Taoism and 
various paganistic ideas about nature, balance, harmony and so on. In China, the 
rapid advance of capitalist development has been accompanied by the (state-
sponsored) expansion of Confucianism with its similarly pacifying refrain that we 
should accept our social/objective position and seek happiness and contentment 
within. In these ways, the future (as in new possibility) is being held hostage by a 
modern sense of fate.  
 
In order to break out of the new medievalism of the modern age, Žižek argues that 
we need to accomplish fully the move from Kant to Hegel. If in Kant there exists an 
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insurmountable gap between the subject and the substantial (noumenal) Thing, in 
Hegel this gap is conceived to be within both subject and substance. Subject and 
substance achieve identity not because of any positive content but because they 
share an essential negativity/incompleteness (they are traversed by the same void). 
Against Kant, the limit of the subject does not subsist in its alienation from (inability to 
grasp) the fullness of substance. The point is rather that substance is already in-itself 
alienated. The subject is the (secondary) result of the inability of substance to 
constitute itself. Substance fails to be and it requires subjective distortion 
(subjectivation) in order to fill in the gaps/inconsistencies and thereby to establish its 
(historical) forms of appearance. At the same time, subjectivation (of substance) is a 
process that can never complete itself. There is always an excess of substance that 
eludes subjectivation. Insofar as it shows the limit/failure of subjectivation, this 
excess corresponds to the persistence of the subject as a constitutive void (the 
failure of subjectivation is the subject). It is on this basis that Hegel derives his notion 
of infinity. In contrast to Badiou – where ontology is conceived as the ‘science of the 
multiple’ (Badiou, 2005: 28) – infinity is not defined through multiplicity but rather 
through the (continual unrest of the) one and its void. Infinity, and all heterogeneity, 
derives from this essential (self-negatory) simplicity. Multiplicity is an effect of the 
failure of the one to constitute itself (universality similarly arises from the failure of 
particularity to achieve its being). It is this simplicity – an unfolding conflictuality 
between something and its void – that moves the world.  
 
In Kant the idea that we are limited/historical actors, cut off from the absolute, allows 
him to maintain the view that there is an Other world of authentic (positive) 
substance. This creates the sense of a mystical space that is today occupied by such 
‘absolutes’ as market forces, global realities, business confidence, the need for 
enterprise and so on. Here capitalism effectively operates with its own (faux) 
Kantian-style ethos: we should make all kinds of subjective adjustments, participate 
in continuous ‘change-making’, while accepting that there is a pre-given index of 
measurement that shapes our fate. In Hegel, by contrast, there is no space for any 
mystical functioning. Substance itself is also incomplete (and incompletable) and can 
only appear in relation to (incompletable) subjectivity. Consequently there is no Other 
(as such) and there are no alibis: we produce our own shadows up to and including 
the indices of measurement we chose to live by. By showing that the absolute is 
inconsistency itself – the impossible (self-negatory) configurations of substance and 
subject – Hegel confronts us with a far more radical, and horrifying, dimension of 
freedom: the freedom to choose fate itself. 
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Throughout Less Than Nothing the Hegelian absolute of substance=subject is 
iterated and developed across a range of contexts. Žižek argues that ultimately the 
problem that we are faced is not epistemological but ontological in character. 
Inconsistency is not something that can be eventually overcome by increasing 
knowledge or by more and better science (á la Meillasoux and speculative realism). 
Inconsistency functions rather as a constitutive ontological crack that runs throughout 
the very structure of all (versions of) reality. In Hegelian terms, the more 
epistemological clarity we achieve the more we approach the absolute qua distortion. 
The question is not the one posed by William James – ‘why is there something rather 
than nothing?’ – but the opposite: ‘why is there nothing rather than something?’ 
(Žižek, 2012: 925). It is this (ontological) question that is taking on an increasing 
relevance for contemporary science: the more the structure of reality is being 
penetrated, the more that science is confirming a fundamental void; a void that 
shows that the ‘building blocks’ of reality are nothing but distortion. And here it should 
be stressed that the void is not known to itself (there is no possibility of being ‘at one’ 
with the void); it is not a passive place then it is then disrupted. The void is rather 
disruption itself, irreducibly split between its ‘true’ and ‘false’ forms; a place of pure 
movement of becoming and un-becoming, the very currency of alienated-ness. 
Indeed it makes more sense to speak of void-ness rather than ‘the void’. 
 
It is against this background that Žižek finds a particular resonance with the ancient 
Greek notion of den (as developed by Democritus). Den is the sublime unrest of 
void-ness and ‘functions’ at a level below the quantifiable (as a less-than-nothing); or, 
more precisely, it functions as a pure surplus of the quantifiable (the unquantifiable 
condition of possibility for the emergence of the quantifiable) as both less than 
nothing and more than something. Den is the paradoxical ‘stuff’ out of which both 
nothing and something are made and, at the same time, it is that which prevents 
nothing and something from fully constituting/stabilizing themselves. Everything is 
derived from, and carries within it, the impossible surplus dimension (or echo) of den. 
In Hegelian terms, den provides a name for pure unrest, non-coincidence and 
intrinsic difference. In Lacanian terms, den correlates to the radical Real. One of the 
ways of characterizing Žižek’s masterwork might be to say that it represents a 
systematic attempt to both de-fatalize fate and to revitalize this sense of den. 
 
The papers that are collected here represent a broad range of engagement with the 
thematic content of Less Than Nothing. The intention has not been simply exegetical 
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(or adversarial), but rather one of attempting to continue the conversation with 
Žižek’s re-working of Hegelian (and Lacanian) insights and openings with a view to 
developing further lines of inquiry. My paper focuses on Žižek’s response to 
questions of science and knowledge in respect of the recent interventions by 
speculative realists such as Meillasoux.  
 
Joseph Carew takes us into Žižek’s metaphysics of the void and draws out the 
consequences of the metaphysical cataclysm that lies at the heart of all being.  
 
Todd McGowan explores Žižek’s arguments in the context of a close reading of 
Hegel wherein he gives central emphasis to (constitutive) alienation.  
 
Rex Butler elaborates on the materialism of the discursive form of Less Than 
Nothing and the way in which Žižek continuously refines examples in order to 
reaffirm the play of drive and inconsistency around the (dialectical) expressions of 
‘nothing’.  
 
Daniel Tutt analyzes the characteristic uses of Oedipal logics in both Žižek and 
Badiou and how these underpin their distinctive approaches to questions of 
subjectivity and emancipatory politics. 
 
Slavoj Žižek completes the cycle with a reaffirmation of the importance of making the 
philosophical move from Kant to Hegel. Rather than maintain a Kantian sense of a 
gap between form and content, we should assume fully the Hegelian insight that this 
gap is reflected back into content itself; content is incomplete, always-already not-all. 
Thus what appears as the failings of culture (the symbolic form) applies equally to 
(the content of) nature. As Hegel points out, nature can never reach the fullness of 
the notion and is at every level dogged by defective and inconsistent manifestations 
of itself. In contrast to Lacan – who sometimes maintained a tendential distinction 
between culture and nature - - Hegel affirms a basic inhesion of the Real across both 
culture and nature. At every turn, Less Than Nothing develops and improvises upon 
this radical interiorization of the Real and perhaps, in this sense, it marks both an end 
and a beginning to philosophical thought.  
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